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by Lynn A. Stanton
Introduction
Labor and environmental concerns motivated the nego-
tiation of side agreements to the North American Free Trade
Agreement Ihereinafter NAFTAj. Entitled "The North Ameri-
can Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mex-
ican States, and the Government of the United States of
America," the environmental side agreement was signed on
September 14. 1993.1 Labor and environmental groups lob-
bied for extra environmental protections to be added to the
NAFTA because of perceived inadequacies in Mexico's envi-
ronmental laws which they feared might create a pollution
haven2 in the wake of free trade. A study done by the United
States Trade Representative showed that Mexico's environ-
mental laws are 'fully equivalent" to the United States' envi-
ronmental laws, but that there is a lack of effective enforce-
ment.3 Enforcement of environmental laws has become the
focus of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
Environmental and labor groups may have good reason to
fear the environmental fallout from free trade between the
United States and Mexico given the appalling environmen-
tal degradation of the border area which resulted from the
free trade experiment, the Maquiladora program, between
Mexico and the United States.
The region's surface waters are veritable sewers,
thick with human feces and industrial toxins. The
subsurface water tables, upon which the arid region
is highly dependent for both human and industrial
consumption needs, are similarly compromised.
Toxic hot spots, areas where industrial and often
hazardous and/or toxic wastes have been disposed
of without regard for law or the environment, dot
the region's landscape.4
*Lynn Stanton is a I-D. Candidate. Spring 1995. University of California.
Hastings College of the Law; BA. with honors. University of California at
Berkeley. 1990. Thanks to Professor Naomi Roht-Anlaza and the I/EWsr-NorTH-
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2, The idea of a pollution haven is that environmental preuention and
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Even more importance attaches to the Agree-
ment given the likelihood that it will serve as the
model for other such agreements as the Clinton
Administration seeks to add South and Central
American partners to the NAFTA.
This Note will assess the likely effectiveness of
the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation to
implement better enforcement of domestic envi-
ronmental laws in Mexico and will examine and
recommend alternative methods which might
achieve more effective enforcement. In Part I, the
background for environmental concerns over the
NAFTA will be examined by looking at the
Maquiladora program and also at Mexico's envi-
ronmental laws and enforcement. In Part II, an in-
depth examination of the Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation will focus on the side agree-
ment's stance on private rights of action, the struc-
ture of the Commission for Environmental Cooper-
ation [hereinafter CEC or Commission], and the
CEC's dispute resolution process. In Part Il, this
Note will examine other dispute resolution agree-
ments in the environmental context to determine
what provisions are most effective in those agree-
ments. In Part IV, recommendations are suggested
for more effective enforcement of environmental
laws in NAFTA countries.
Part I: The Background for
Environmental Concerns Over Free Trade
Mexico's environmental laws appear to have
failed to protect against degradation.5 This failure is
especially evident at the border and strongly moti-
vates worries about the NAFTA's effects on the envi-
ronment. While it is beyond the scope of this Note
to examine Mexican environmental laws in great
detail, or even the means by which those laws are
enforced and the many theories as to why they fail,
at least some background is necessary to provide a
context for understanding the importance of the
concerns which motivated the Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation. The Maquiladora region is
a living example of these concerns. A glimpse of the
legal, political, and economic climate is essential to
an understanding of the impediments to Mexican
domestic environmental law effectiveness.
A. The Maquiladora Experiment
Maquiladora comes from the Spanish verb
maquilar, meaning to perform a task for another.6 A
Maquiladora is a factory which makes goods pur-
suant to a free trade treaty experiment between the
United States and Mexico which was signed in 1971.7
The treaty allows American-owned factories located
in Mexico to import raw materials into Mexico with-
out paying duties and then export a finished or part-
ly finished product back to the United States, 8 The
goods they produce are subject to a United States
customs duty, payable on export, based only on the
value added to the product outside the country-in
this case, the foreign labor.9 The treaty promoted
what was perceived as a mutually beneficial arrange-
ment: the Mexicans get jobs, the foreign factory own-
ers get cheap labor, and Americans get inexpensive
goods. These factories are owned primarily by Amer-
icans, although some are owned by Japanese. Since
its inception in 1971, the program has grown explo-
sively: it started with twelve plants employing rough-
ly 3,000 workers; by its twentieth anniversary in 1991,
the program boasted 1,936 plants with almost
500,000 employees.10
While the Maquiladora program has enjoyed
great short-term economic success, the environ-
mental degradation it has caused has brought
attention to the dangers of free trade programs."
The American Medical Association [hereinafter
AMA] described the border region, where large
numbers of the Maquiladoras are located, as a "vir-
tual cesspool and breeding ground for infectious
disease." 2 The report went further, finding that
"luincontrolled air and water pollution is rapidly
deteriorating and seriously affecting the health and
future economic vitality on both sides of the bor-
der."' 3 There are two obvious explanations for what
is causing the environmental degradation: I) the
Maquiladoras improperly dispose of their haz-
ardous wastes; and 2) the "colonias," the shanty
towns which spring up around Maquiladoras, have
improper and inadequate water and sanitation
facilities."4
5. See Houseman, supra note 4.
6. See Sherri M. Durand. 3 KAN. I. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 128, 129
(1994).
7. Stephen Lemer, Comment, The MaquiLadoras and Hazardous
Waste: The Effects Under NAFTA. 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 255, 257 (1993).
8. Michael Connor, Maquiladoras and the Environment: Prospects for
Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 CoLO. 1. INT'L. ENvnL. L. & PoL'Y
683, 683 (1992).
9. Id. at 686.
10. Id.
1i. See Houseman, supra note 4 and Satchell, Infra note 12,
12. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWs AND WouL
REPonr, May 6, 1991, at 32.
13. Id.
14. Connor, supra note 8. at 697.
Lynn A. Stanton Volume 2. Num" I
Fd 1994 l L.I' iiva~ ~aArenn
Mexican regulations require that hazardous
wastes be returned to their country of origin."5
Despite this requirement, in 1988, only 7 out of 748
Maquiladoras requested shipment of hazardous
waste back into the United States. 16 In 1990, the
total number of requests rose to eighty-five. 17
According to one report by the Secretaria de Desar-
rollo Urbano y Ecologia ihereinafter SEDUE, the
Mexican equivalent of the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPAII, 52% of
Maquiladoras generate hazardous wastes, but only
30% have complied with regulations requiring infor-
mation to be provided to SEDUE about disposal of
these wastes, and only 19% are complying with
waste disposal laws. 18 A California Regional Water
Quality Control Board report done on the New
River, which originates south of Mexicali, crosses
the border, and empties into the Salton Sea near a
National Wildlife Refuge,' 9 gives strong evidence of
improper disposal of hazardous wastes.20 The report
found evidence of numerous industrial chemicals
and fifteen viruses capable of causing cholera,
dysentery, hepatitis, meningitis, polio, and
typhoid.2' A study done by the National Toxics
Campaign Fund in 1990 showed that toxic organic
chemicals were being discharged from industrial
plants at levels which violate both EPA and Mexican
standards. 22 Water samples from sixteen of twenty-
two locations violated both Mexican and United
States water quality standards. 23
The other environmental problem is the colo-
nias. Colonias have sprung up on both sides of the
border.24 They have brought with them increases in
disease caused by a lack of potable water and inade-
quate sanitation facilities. 25 The incidence of hepati-
tis in border areas like that between El Paso and
Brownsville in Texas is six times the national aver-
age.26 In the El Paso colonia of San Elizario, 85% to
90% of adults contract hepatitis by age thirty-five.27




19. d. at 695-696.
20. d.
21. Id.
22. Satchell. supra note 12. at 40.
23. I.
24. Connor. supra note 8. at 697.
25. I.
26. Satchell. supra note 12. at 41.
27. 1.
B. Mexican Environmental Law and Enforcement
Mexican environmental laws greatly resemble
those of the United States, because Mexico's 1988
General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Envi-
ronmental Protection [hereinafter the 1988 lawl was
modeled on United States environmental statutes
and regulations.28
Most significantly, hazardous waste is
specifically defined and follows closely the
U.S. guidelines related to corrosivity, reac-
tivity, toxicity, and ignitability. In addition.
requirements for documenting (i.e. mani-
festing) shipments of hazardous wastes are
delineated, Environmental Impact State-
ments (EIS) on new projects are mandated,
and no hazardous waste is allowed to be
imported into Mexico unless the waste can
be recycled or reused in Mexico.29
The 1988 law was a reaction to Mexico's 1982
Federal Environmental Law and its 1984 Amend-
ments which failed to provide any definitions or
require any strong enforcement by SEDUE.30 The
inadequacies of the 1982 law resulted in environ-
mental degradation and led to an amendment to the
Mexican Constitution in 1987 which gave the gov-
ernment the right to impose measures on private
owners for benefits to the public interest and eco-
logical balance.3' The 1988 law provides concrete
guidelines and criminal and administrative sanc-
tions for failure to comply with regulations regard-
ing hazardous materials.32 SEDUE issues technical
standards, and the government (federal, state, or
local) may impose sanctions for non-compliance 3
Tort law is available as an alternative to crimi-
nal or administrative sanctions in Mexico under the
Mexican Civil Code.34 Liability is based on a stan-
dard similar to the reasonable person duty in U.S.
tort law.3' Mexican tort liability, however, is restrict-
ed by statute.36 For instance, damages are limited;
28 Connor. supra note 8. quoting General Law for Ecological
Equilibuium and Environmental Protection. DL.o OcLk. c LAS ED-
Epi:Os (DO), lan. 28. 1988.
29. Connor. supra note 8. at 692 (citations emitted).
30. U at 691
31. 11 (quoting Vex. Const. art. 27).
32 Connor. supra note 8. at 692.
33. hL
34. L at 693. See c:-o Cm,. pA-A EL EsrAno uNins Mnci.r;o
(CCDT.); Co:oo Cr,u. (for each state) (Mex).
35 Se: Daniel L Basurto Gonzales & Elaine Flud Rodriguez.
Entimnw1lAsrccftauitibra Opmrtans: A Not o CauffonforU.S.
Parent Corprathns. 22 ST. ?,Wsrs L. 659.677 (1991).
36 Set supra note 28.
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one cannot receive compensation for mental
anguish or loss of consortium, and no punitive
damages may be assessed.3 7 Also, no class actions
or contingent fee arrangements are available under
Mexican law, making such suits unrewarding and
difficult to finance.3 8
Despite the many similarities between Mexican
environmental laws and United States environmen-
tal laws, their effectiveness is far from similar. The
ineffectiveness of Mexican environmental laws as
compared to the United States' laws arises in part
from the lack of money available to SEDUE for
enforcement. SEDUE's budget is $0.48 per capita,
while United States expenditures for environmental
protection are $24.40 per capita.3 9 Such a limited
budget provides enormous challenges to environ-
mental law enforcement in Mexico.
Mexico's political climate also seems to discour-
age the enforcement of its environmental laws. Both
citizens and scientists appear to be actively deterred
from pursuing enforcement of environmental laws
and information about environmental law violations.
One example of this is Carmen Hernandez de
Vasquez, former head of the Tijuana civil protection
office, who was warned, then fired, while investigat-
ing a toxic waste site owned by a United States
firm.40 She was told that her investigations and pub-
lic-awareness campaigns were "alarming" the citizen-
ry.41 Many other Mexican environmental critics have
alleged that they too are being pressured to keep
quiet by threats of firings and funding cuts. 42
Private citizens are also discouraged from com-
plaining. Not only is little information made avail-
able to them, but there is a "Big Brother"-like pres-
sure brought to bear on those who complain. For
example, ABC's Primetine Live television news team
followed a group of residents of a Maquiladora
region in Matamoras, Mexico, as they went to
SEDUE to complain about rampant dumping of haz-
ardous chemicals in their neighborhood. 43 The
SEDUE official promised to get back to the group in
three days. 44 Three days later, the official refused to
allow the news team into the interview, but a
woman who talked to the official reported that the
official admitted fo accusing the group of being "for-
eign agents" and telling them that they were all
under investigation. 4'
Given this climate, practitioners will find it dif-
ficult to gather information, find citizens who are
willing to bring suit, or recover much in damages
against a Maquiladora. Many Maquiladoras further
protect themselves by investing very little in their
Mexican factories, so that little is at risk from
suits. 6 Even if a successful claim is made in Mexi-
co, insufficient capital holdings in Mexico will cre-
ate the need for additional litigation in the United
States to make the judgment enforceable against
the American parent corporation.47
Part II: The Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
creates the Commission for Environmental Cooper-
ation.48 The actions taken by the CEC, and its acces-
sibility to members of the public, may play a signif-
icant role in arbitrating disputes over the environ-
ment and negotiating change in each country's
laws. To assess the likely effectiveness of the Agree-
ment, an in-depth analysis of the CEC and the pro-
visions of the Agreement is necessary.
A. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation
The CEC provides a forum for dispute resolu-
tion regarding environmental matters. The Commis-
sion is composed of three parts: a Council, a Secre-
tariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.49
I. The Council
The main task of the Council is to oversee the
implementation of the Agreement on Environmen-
tal Cooperation and to make recommendations
regarding pollution control technology, data gather-
ing, protection of flora and fauna, eco-labelling,
emergency preparedness, and stronger pollution
control laws, as well as other concerns.50 The Coun-
cil is made up of cabinet-level representatives (or
designees) from each member country Ihereinafter
country or countries] and conducts public meetings
37. Connor. supra note 8, at 693.
38. Richard Vaznaugh, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Environ-
mental Muscle for the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 HAS NGS
INT'L & CoMp. L. Ray. 207, 215 (1993).
39. Satchell, supra note 12, at 36.
40. Vaznaugh, supra note 38, at 219.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Primetime Live, (ABC television broadcast). Apr. 1. 1993
(transcript available in LEXIS. NEXIS Library. ABCNEWS file).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Vaznaugh, supra note 38, at 217.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 10, § 2.
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at least once a year and additional meetings at the
request of any member country.Y The Council works
on a consensus basis, except in cases of enforce-
ment challenges and other specified areas, where a
two-thirds majority is required.
2. The Secretariat
The Secretariat provides "technical, adminis-
trative, and operational support to the Council."*2
The Secretariat prepares an annual report for the
Commission covering the actions member coun-
tries have taken to fulfill their obligations under
the Agreement, including data on domestic
enforcement of laws, information submitted by
non-governmental organizations, and any matter
referred to the Secretariat by the Council. The Sec-
retariat may investigate any matter on its own ini-
tiative, except domestic enforcement of environ-
mental laws. The Council may veto any investiga-
tion by the Secretariat with a two-thirds majority.
The Secretariat is run by an Executive Director, a
position which rotates between nationals of each
country.53
3. The Joint Public Advisory Committee
The Joint Public Advisory Committee is the
Council's source for technical and scientific infor-
mation.54 The Committee consists of fifteen mem-
bers (unless the Council decides otherwise) with
equal numbers from each country. The Committee
provides advice to the Council and to the Secretari-
at upon request. 55
B. The Process of Dispute Resolution in the
Commission
Dispute resolution is the main function of the
CEC. The dispute resolution process provides a
forum for resolution of enforcement problems with
a member country, such as Mexico. Since there are
stiff penalties for failing to abide by the arbitrated
result,56 the hope is that this process may succeed
in encouraging enforcement of domestic environ-
mental laws in each country. However, the process
is long and requires not only that a member coun-
try file a complaint calling for the initiation of an
arbitration panel but also that another country join
the request. 7
If a dispute arises, the complaining country
may request consultations with the complained-of
country to attempt to resolve the dispute."8 If con-
sultations fails, within sixty days of the request for
consultations, a party may request a special session
of the Council.' 9 The Council may then offer advice,
mediate, or create working groups to attempt to
resolve the dispute.P0 However, if the matter is not
resolved within sixty days, a consulting party may
request an arbitral panel.6' With approval of two-
thirds of the Council, a panel is convened from an
existing roster to consider whether there is a "per-
sistent pattern of failure by the Party complained
against to effectively enforce its environmental
laws "62 and whether this failure affects goods or ser-
vices that are traded between the countries or are in
competition with goods or services of the com-
plaining country. 63 There are several obstacles to
successful implementation of this process. For
instance, a failure to achieve a two-thirds majority
vote in the Council would halt the process before an
arbitral panel was ever formed. Also, even if the
panel is convened, it may not have enough evidence
to support a finding of a persistent pattern of failure
to enforce environmental laws on the part of the
complained-of country. Further, it may be difficult
to establish a direct connection between the persis-
tent pattern of failed enforcement and an effect on
goods or services in another country. These factors
place an onerous burden on a complaining country
and might, in some cases, discourage complaints.
When a panel is convened, it issues a final
report.6 If the parties do not agree on an imple-
mentation plan consistent with that report within
sixty days, the panel may be reconvened for the pur-
pose of deciding on an implementation plan.65 If
the parties do not agree that an implementation
plan is being properly implemented 180 days after
the plan is established or approved, the panel may
again be reconvened. 6 If the panel agrees that the
plan is not being fully implemented, it may impose
a monetary enforcement assessment against the
country found to be in violation; the assessment
51. Id. art. 9, §§ 1. 4. Annual meetings are publi. The addi.
tional meetings are public only if the Council decides that they
should be. Id. art 9. § 4.
52. d. art. 11. § 5.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 16.
55. Id.
56. Id. Annex 34.
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63. U art 24
64-1.
65 l art 34.§ I
66- Uart 3.4§ and 3
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may not exceed twenty million dollars (U.S.) for the
first year of the agreement.6 7 The money received
from such an assessment is paid into a fund, which
is used to "improve or enhance the environment or
environmental enforcement in the [country] com-
plained against."68 An order for an assessment
against Canada is filed in a domestic court of Cana-
da which will enforce the collection of the assess-
ment without opportunity for appeal.69 If the United
States or Mexico fails to pay an assessment within
180 days, the complaining country may suspend the
benefits of the free trade agreement to impose tar-
iffs sufficient to collect the assessment.70
A private interested party may complain to the
Secretariat, in writing, with proper documentation,
of an alleged persistent failure by a member country
to enforce environmental laws. The most that will
result from such a private complaint is the compila-
tion of a factual record.7 ' The factual record, howev-
er, cannot be compiled without a two-thirds majori-
ty vote of the Council.72 Another two-thirds majority
vote is required to make the factual record public.73
C. Private Right of Action
The successful enforcement of environmental
laws in the United States is due in great part to suits
initiated by private parties, such as environmental-
ists and industry members, who challenge interpre-
tations of regulations and force regulatory agencies
to take action.7 4 The Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation requires only a small protection of the
private right of action in enforcement of environ-
mental laws.
Article 6 of the Agreement requires each coun-
try to "ensure that persons with a legally recognized
interest under its law" have access to the courts and
administrative proceedings of that country.7 5 In the
United States, where most environmental laws pro-
vide for a private right of action, this provision
almost certainly effects no change. Since the lan-
guage of this article only requires access for those
with a legally recognized interest, there is no man-
date to change laws to allow non-citizens to sue.76
Similarly, Mexico will not be required under
this provision to open up its courts to American
parties who might wish to challenge a lack of
enforcement. Article 6 sets out no suggested goals
or recommended standards to determine what
interests ought to be "legally recognized." However,
the article does specify the types of rights and
remedies that ought to be available in the courts
and proceedings, including injunctions, damages,
and enforcement orders.77
Article 7 guarantees some procedural rights in
the trial or hearing. The member countries are to
ensure "fair[,J open[,J and equitable" proceedings,
by complying with "due process of law," opening
hearings to the public whenever possible, allowing
the presentation of evidence, and avoiding unrea-
sonable delay, complications, or excessive fees.78
Opinions shall be in writing and made available to
the public.7 9
Article 10 briefly addresses the notion of a right
of action for citizens of a NAFTA country who are
not citizens of the complained-of country.80 As the
Agreement stands, there is no assurance that any
such system for cross-border suits will be devel-
oped. The idea of a cross-border citizen suit is rele-
gated to "consideration" by the Council. 8' The
Council is to consider the issue and make a recom-
mendation on such suits "as appropriate."82 The
cross-border citizen suit might be the best way to
ensure enforcement of environmental laws, because
United States environmental groups are already
skilled at, and well-funded for, such efforts. Further,
any corruption or political pressure on citizens in
Mexico would discourage these suits. Since United
States citizens are more removed from these pres-
sures, they would be less likely to be deterred from
filing and prosecuting suits.
D. Summary
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
appears to allow for almost no citizen intervention
67. Id. Annex 34, § 1.
68. Id. Annex 34, § 3.
69. Id. Annex 36A.
70. Id. art. 36, § 2.
71. Id. art. 14.
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 15, § 7.
74. See generally, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 411 F.
Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 412 U.S. 541
(1973). Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Indus-
trial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
75. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note I,
art. 6, § 2.
76. On the other hand, section 304 of the Clean Air Act pro-
vides a private right of action for non-citizens: "any person may
commence a civil action" and "Itlhe district courts shall have Juris-
diction, without regard to the citizenship of the parties," 42 U.SC, §
7604 (a) (West 1992).
77. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1,
art. 6. § 3.
78. Id. art. 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 10.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 10, § 9.
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or meaningful input. There are only two possible
inroads for private citizens or groups to access the
CEC. First, the groups or citizens may attempt to
influence their country's representative on the
Council. Even if the representative for the United
States is swayed by such influence, that representa-
tive would then need to influence another country's
representative (Canada's representative in the case
of a complaint against Mexico) to make it past the
stage of mere consultations with the complained-of
country.83 This is a significant barrier. The other
potential inroad to the CEC is through the Secre-
tariat, to whom anyone may file a complaint with
proper documentation.8 4 However, the complaint
will go no further unless two of the three member
countries agree to gather more information regard-
ing the complaint.85 Both of these approaches
require significant lobbying of two governments-
no small task by any reading.
Part III: Alternative Methods of Environmental
Treaties and Agreements
While a number of treaties and agreements
have been formed to attempt to resolve trans-
boundary environmental problems, most have
failed to be very effective. Most of these treaties
have required parties to agree to vague declarations
on the importance of the environment and have
relied on the good faith of the parties to follow
through on these declarations "as appropriate. 8 6
Unfortunately, the ubiquitous presence of words
like "as appropriate" and the lack of any enforce-
ment mechanism have left parties unable to require
any action by other parties.
There do exist a few environmental treaties or
agreements which are notable for having achieved a
modicum of success. Generally they have achieved
this success by setting specific requirements with
avenues for enforcement. A few of these treaties will
be examined for methods which might be applied to
the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
A. The Nordic Convention
The Nordic Convention of 1974 [hereinafter
Conventioni took a unique approach to environ-
mental remedies by opening up its domestic court
system to non-citizens who are citizens of a signa-
tory country.8 7 Sweden. Finland, Denmark, and Nor-
way agreed to principles of equal access and non-
discrimination. Non-citizens are given the same
access to courts for litigation of claims against pol-
luters. Further, the non-citizen is given treatment
equal to that which a citizen might receive. The
Convention provides that "any person who is affect-
ed or may be affected by a nuisance caused by envi-
ronmentally harmful activities in another Contract-
ing State"8 may bring that action before the court of
that country "on the same terms as a legal entity of
the State in which such actions are being carried
out."8 9 Of course, since only four countries are party
to this Convention, the effectiveness is limited.
Other efforts expanding the right of cross-bor-
der citizen suits have not been as effective as the
Nordic Convention. In 1976. the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development [here-
inafter OECDI issued a recommendation for"Imple-
mentation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier
Pollution."9 To date, the recommendation has not
achieved much success.91 The United States and
Canada entered into the 1rransboundary Pollution
Reciprocal Access Act (hereinafter United States-
Canada Act or Act) to give reciprocal equal access
for victims of transboundary pollution. 2 However,
this Act has only been ratified by a handful of states
and provinces within the two countries.93 It may
very well be that, should the Council of the CEC
decide to adopt a recommendation as to reciprocal
access to the courts, such a recommendation would
meet with the same lack of enthusiasm as did the
OECD's recommendation and the United States-
Canada Act. The carrot of a free trade package might
have been sufficient inducement to create a recip-
rocal right of action, but now there is not as much
bargaining power, since the free trade package is
already a fait accompli.
83. Id. art. 34. § 1
84. Id. art. 15. § 2.
85. Id. art 15.§7.
86. See infra notes 87-89.
87. Convention on the Protection of the Environment. Fed. 19.
1974. Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Swed., art. 3. 13 I.L.M. 591. 591-97.
88. I.
89. Id.
90. Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
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B. The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol Ihereinafter Protocoll
was negotiated under the Vienna Convention in
1987 to address the problem of ozone depletion.94 It
has been hailed as one of the most effective inter-
national treaties.9' This is due, in large part, to its
effective use of trade incentives.96 The Protocol bans
parties from trade in ozone-depleting chemicals
with non-parties to the Protocol.97 Since most of the
developed countries are parties to the Protocol,
countries that would like to trade in such chemicals
have strong incentives to sign the Protocol. Further,
the Protocol sets up a fund (the Multilateral fund),
which, among other things, aids developing coun-
tries in meeting the demands of the Protocol.98
If the Protocol fails in any respect, it is in the
provision of effective enforcement. If non-compli-
ance is complained of, there is a process of dispute
resolution which involves making a complaint to
the Secretariat of the Vienna Convention. The party
complained-of then responds to the complaint, and
the information is forwarded to an Implementation
Committee. 99 The Implementation Committee
makes a report of its findings to the Meeting of the
Parties for implementation of the decision. 100 How-
ever, if a party chooses not to implement the deci-
sion, there is nothing more that can be done. Fur-
ther, there is no effective method for assessing
whether countries are meeting the reduction
requirements (for reducing the use of ozone deplet-
ing chemicals). Since countries do their own report-
ing of the base level and any reduction, such num-
bers may be suspect.' 0'
C. United States Domestic Negotiated Rulemaking
Negotiated rulemaking was developed in
response to dissatisfaction with notice and com-
ment procedures in federal agency rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedures Act. 102 The tra-
ditional rulemaking processes have been criticized
for being too adversarial and for inappropriately
grafting judicial processes onto a quasi-legislative,
policy-making process. 03 Negotiated rulemaking
allows interested parties to a federal rule to negoti-
ate a mutually acceptable rule. 04 Each party can
individually weigh the different policy choices and
make trade-offs in the negotiation process based on
the relative value of one policy over another,' 05 This
ensures a better representation of actual interests In
the rulemaking process. The negotiations tend to be
successful, because the threat of a rule developed
under the traditional procedure acts as an incentive
to reaching agreement. 06 Several federal agencies
have successfully used negotiated rulemaking. For
instance, the EPA has used negotiated rulemaking
to develop proposed rules on non-conformance
penalties for vehicle emissions and on emergency
exemptions from pesticide regulations. 07
Participants in the negotiated rulemaking pro-
cedure are selected by giving notice to the known
interested parties. Others are allowed to join based
upon whether their interest might give rise to stand-
ing to challenge the rule in court.1 08 By including
anyone who might be able to challenge the rule, the
agency can avoid many lengthy court battles and
assures that the negotiations are meaningful.
Many of the concepts of negotiated rulemaking
are incorporated into international treaties. For
instance, as previously discussed under the Mon-
treal Protocol, in the event of a dispute, an Imple-
mentation Committee is impanelled to facilitate a
consensual agreement between the parties, but
with the threat that the dispute will be submitted to
a Meeting of the Parties if a consensus is not
reached. 109 This may not be effective, because the
parties may make diplomatic, though environmen-
tally undesirable, compromises. Nevertheless, it at
least motivates a discussion of solutions.
D. The Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement
and the International Joint Commission
The friendly relationship between the United
States and Canada has been responsible in large
part for the successes in negotiating agreements
over transboundary issues, such as pollution and
water boundaries, because many of these agree-
94. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). [hereinafter Protocoll
95. See Houseman, supra note 4, at 553.
96. id.
97. See Protocol, supra note 94, at art. 4.
98. Id. art. 10.
99. Third Meeting of the Parties of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL. Pro. 3/11 (June 21, 1991).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1992). See
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking before Federal Agencies: Evalu-
ation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 74 GEo. L. 1. 1625 (1986).
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ments rely on voluntary negotiations to work out dis-
putes." 0 In the 1991 Canada-United States Agree-
ment on Air Quality Ihereinafter Agreement on Air
Qualityl, if a dispute arises over the interpretation of
the Agreement on Air Quality, the parties first enter
into consultations and, in the event consultation
fails, next consider whether to submit the dispute to
the International Joint Commission Ihereinafter
IICI.'" For disputes over other issues, however, the
parties must consult, and if that fails, they must
.refer the matter to an appropriate third party.f" 2
What gives these consultations a likelihood of suc-
cess is the transparency'13 and availability of the
progress reports made by the two countries. The
Agreement on Air Quality also requires the Bilateral
Air Quality Committee (with three members from
each country) to prepare progress reports every two
years." 4 These reports are given to each country, as
well as to the IIC and the public." 5 The IIC invites
comments on the reports (making use of public
hearings), reviews the information, and puts togeth-
er a record of the comments which is then released
to the public." 6 This provides a check on the accura-
cy of reports made by the countries' representatives
and gives the public access to the documents."17
By requiring public disclosure of the progress
each party is making, the Agreement on Air Quality
allows citizens to put pressure on their govern-
ments to make changes, and consultations are thus
encouraged. This transparency also promotes accu-
rate reporting.
Part IV. Recommendations
A. Citizen Suit Provisions
While the Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration takes a step in the right direction by requir-
ing the opening of courts to some individuals to sue,
a cross-border citizen suit provision is still needed.
The Agreement does not ensure a right to sue to
individuals who are citizens of either the com-
plained-of country or another member country. Any
member country is free to place burdensome restric-
110. For example, the Boundary Waters Treaty prohibits pol-
lution of boundary waters, but the International joint Commission
may only make recommendations on compliance disputes, unless
both countries submit to binding arbitration, which they have
neverdone. Boundary Waters Treaty. Jan. 11. 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit.. 36
Stat. 2448.
111. Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13. 1991. art. XII. US,-
Can.. 30 LLM. 676. The IlC was established by the Boundary\Waters
Treaty. See supra note 110. The IJC is available to make recommen-
dations on transboundary pollution problems between the United
States and Canada, but its recommendations are not binding.
tions to recognizing a right of action for citizen or
non-citizen suits. Ensuring a right of action to citi-
zens would not be enough on its own if citizens fear
that corruption of the system may put their lives or
liberty in danger by exercising that right. Since Unit-
ed States citizens have great experience and
resources, and as there is a long history in the Unit-
ed States of suits to enforce environmental laws, a
cross-border citizen suit provision would greatly
enhance environmental law enforcement efforts.
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
would be more effective if it included provisions
requiring domestic rights of action for those who
can show an injury from failure to enforce environ-
mental laws. Further, the Agreement should incor-
porate a cross-border citizen suit option, such as
that contained in the Nordic Convention. With that
example of a workable system available, it should
not be difficult to achieve a workable model for the
NAFTA countries. This would then allow citizen
action to address any particular failure to enforce
domestic environmental laws (as opposed to the
weighty burden of proving a "persistent failure" as
required under the CEC) and deter pollution by giv-
ing injured parties the right to seek tort damages in
many cases.
B. Transparency
Transparency allows citizen groups to learn the
facts of a problem and lobby for a particular out-
come through public opinion pressure. There are
some measures in the Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation which may give onlookers information
about the facts available to, and actions taken by,
the CEC. For example, the Secretariat's annual
report, including assessments of the state of the
environment of each member country, must be
released publicly. This will aid the public's partici-
pation in assessing the validity of progress as
reported by nations and also encourage citizen pres-
sure on governments through disclosure of the envi-
ronmental status of each country. However, greater
transparency in the process would give the consul-
tation requirements more effectiveness, would allow
112 Supra note IlIL
113. The term *transparency' Is used to indicate a process
whereby reports and findings are available to the public so that the
public may be informed about the state of disputed matters.
114 See supra note I 1I.
115 Md
116 if
117 Se ger.featly. leffrey L Roelofs. United Stats-Canada Air
Ounay Agrem.ent. A Framriif:rAdr.r TransEourdary Air PaoMan
Ptr!m. 26 CORNELL INYr'L LI 421 (1993)
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for more extensive citizen participation, and would
be of aid to other aspects of the Agreement.
Currently, allegations of failure to enforce envi-
ronmental laws may be made by private citizens,
but a report will result only if two-thirds of the
member countries allow it to be prepared. Then, a
further two-thirds vote is necessary to make the
report public. Instead, a report should be prepared
whenever the Secretariat finds that the allegations
meet the criteria in Article 14. The resulting report
should always be made public. This record should
then be considered by the Council. If one member
of the Council, or both the Secretariat and the joint
Public Advisory Committee (by a majority vote),
decide that the report shows evidence of a failure to
enforce environmental laws, then the dispute reso-
lution process, with mandatory arbitration at the
end, should be invoked.
Transparency would also allow the public to
participate in the process of monitoring environ-
mental law enforcement. Breaches in enforcement
could then be dealt with, notwithstanding any pos-
sible diplomatic implications inherent in initiation
of the dispute resolution process. An increase in
pressure on member countries to achieve more
effective enforcement of environmental laws will
almost certainly benefit the environment.
C. Negotiated Rulemaking
The Agreement would be improved by
increased participation at the consultation stage
such as occurs during negotiated rulemaking.
According private rights of action to domestic citi-
zens and citizens of other member countries would
likely increase enforcement, as well as participation
in the dispute resolution process. Although consul-
tations are required if a dispute arises under the
current Agreement, the consultations only involve
the two member countries. Such negotiated settle-
ments are therefore subject to challenge in court by
anyone who was injured by an enforcement failure.
Greater representation and participation of inter-
ested parties in the consultation process will
decrease the likelihood of a successful court chal-
lenge and encourage better advocacy of environ-
mental issues. Although compromise may be more
difficult between more parties, it would be in the
best interest of resolution of a dispute to adopt the
inclusive approach characteristic of negotiated
rulemaking. By bringing in other interested parties
early on in the process-thus increasing public par-
ticipation-the ability to formulate an environmen-
tally sound solution would be strengthened. Addi-
tionally, transparency of proceedings is likely to
increase public pressure, while the threat of the
arbitration panel is likely to give incentive to effec-
tive negotiation.
Conclusion
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
has many strong provisions, such as the sanctions
for lack of enforcement, the transparency of some
procedures, and the requirement of consultations.
However, much of this may not be effective without
needed additions. Sanctions may never be reached
with a strict two-country majority requirement for
action, and no domestic enforcement by private
suit may be possible. The Agreement needs a
requirement that a cross-border citizen suit agree-
ment between the member countries be reached.
The dispute resolution process would be much
improved if the Secretariat were empowered to
investigate legitimate complaints from member
countries and make the record public. The Agree-
ment shows much promise in encouraging tech-
niques such as public input and participation,
transparency of records, consultations with the
threat of arbitration, and private rights of action.
But encouragement is not enough. The Agreement
needs provisions which will guarantee that legiti-
mate complaints of failure to enforce environmen-
tal laws made by consumer groups and industry
will also be investigated, and that actions will be
taken based on the findings of those investigations.
The Agreement on Environ-mental Cooperation
will have to evolve and strengthen if it is truly to
protect our global environment.
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Agreement on Air Quality, Can.-U.S.. Mar. 13, 1991.
art. XJI, 30 1.L.M. 676.
Agreement that transboundary air pollution causes signifi-
cant environmental harm and that air pollution can effective-
ly be reduced through cooperative or coordinated action.
Establishes both general and specific air quality objectives.
Also establishes procedures for assessment, notification. mit-
igation. exchange of information, review, consultations, refer-
rals. and settlements of disputes.
Michael Connor, Maquiladoras and the Environr,ent:
Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3
COLO. 1. INVL ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 683 (1992).
Evaluates the industrial situation and environmental effects
created at the US-Mexico border and analyzes possible reme-
dies for border citizens. Provides (1) historical background on
the maquiladora (assembly plant) program and the present
state of the environmental agreements between the United
States and Mexico. as well as the applicable domestic legal
authority within each country. (2) evidence of the deteriorat-
ing environmental situation and discusses some of the prob-
lems in the system as it now exists, and (3) a discussion of
possible short-term solutions and the prospect of the pro-
posed Free Trade Agreement providing a more long-term rem-
edy.
Convention on the Protection of the Environment
Between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Swe-
den, Feb. 19, 1974, art. 3, 13 I.L.M. 591-97.
Agreement finding an urgent need to protect and improve the
environment Provides that persons may question the per-
missibility of environmentally harmful activities In an appro-
priate court or administrative agency. Including the issue of
measures to prevent damage and to appeal court or adminis-
trative decisions.
Daniel I. Basurto Gonzales & Elaine Flud Rodriguez,
Environmental Aspects of Maquiladora Operations:A
Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 659, 677 (1991).
Examines the status of various Mexican laws and regulations
addressing environmental concerns as they pertain to assem-
bly plant operations in Mexico and the current political cli-
mate as it relates to the meaningful enforcement of such laws
and regulations. Explores the potential liability of United
States parent corporations for the -environmental sins" of a
Mexican assembly plant subsidiary under laws in both Mexi-
co and the United States.
Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental
Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvrL.
L. REV. 593 (1993).
Focuses on the enforcement approach advocated by the Cen-
ter for International Environmental Law and the Defenders of
Wildlife. Sets forth the enforcement proposals promulgated
by the govemments of the three Parties. the U.S. Congress.
and by the environmental community. Analyzes the two basic
approaches to enforcement found in these proposals, con-
dluding with suggestions for the most effective ways to incor-
porate environmental enforcement provisions in the NAFFA
side agreements.
Robert F. Housman & Durwood 1. Zaelke, Making
Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforc-
ing: Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENvL. L.
545, 553 (1993).
Argues that environmental and international trade policies
must become mutually reinforcing so that environmental
policies do not distort trade flovs and economic activities do
not continue in an unsound and unsustainable manner. Con-
siders competitive sustainability as the means for achieving
sustainable development and finds that an international ss-
tem of Incentives and disincentives will create a mutually
reinforcing mechanism for directing trade and environmental
policies towmard Improving the worldvide standard of living.
Henry H. Perritt. Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking before Feder-
al Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.j. 1625 (1986).
Examines negotiated rulemaking and deems it a realistic
altemathe to adversarial administrative procedures. Covers
the evolution of the negotiated rulemaking concept, concep-
tual models dravn from political science and dispute resolu-
tion negotiation, some examples of negotiations and future
agency plans with respect to negotiated rulemaking. malor
legal Issues affecting future use of negotiated rulemaking and
the basis for the 1935 Administrative Conference of the Unit-
ed States recommendations.
Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality
Agreement: A Frameork for Addressing Transbound-
ary Air Pollution Problems. 26 CORNELL IN'l. L.J. 421
(1993).
Anal es the United States-Canada Air Ouality Agreement
and posits that the agreement sets up a comprehensive
framesork in which both countries can effectively address
problem;of transboundaxy air pollution. Des aibesthe nature
and scope of the acid rain problem; surveys past bilateral.
multilateral. and domestic attempts to address the problem;
and determines that such elforts were Ineffective. Discusses
negotiations and difficulties encountered in reaching agree-
ment and examines the resulting agreement, deeming it a
success
David S. Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of
Non-States in International Environmental Law, 9
PAce ENvnm L. REv. 475 (1992).
Traces the movement away from the traditional state-cen-
tered view of international environmental protection. Dls-
cusses the history of the non-state party in numerous inter-
national and domestic forums. including the International
Court of justice. and examines the recent changes which have
increased the power of non-state interests despite the
absence of an absolute right for non-state actors to initiate
environmental claims within the International forum.
Richard Vaznaugh. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Envi-
ronmental Muscle for the North American Fre Trade
Agreement, 17 HASnNGS INTL & COMP. L. REv. 207,
215 (1993).
This Note was published as the NAFTA was being passed; itis
somewhat prospective In its analysis. It examines the
NAFTA's potentially dire erironmental effect., and analyzes
extraterritorial environmental regulation, offering itas a high-
ly effective yet controversial solution to Mexico's poor envi-
ronmental regulatory structure. Asserts that if environmental
deterioration along the Mexican border persists, extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction remains a solution to the regulatory imbal-
ance between the United States and Mexico.

